Central banks have generally opposed targeting asset and credit market excess. Th is paper argues against that position. Bubbles can impose signifi cant harm through the debt footprint eff ects they leave behind, and through distortions resulting from using interest rates to mitigate their aggregate demand impacts. Conventional interest rate policy is not well suited to managing bubbles, and the paper argues for adoption of a new system of asset based reserve requirements (ABRR). Not only can ABRR target asset market excess, they also strengthen counter-cyclical monetary policy.
Reconstructing monetary policy after the Great Recession
For the last several years central bank thinking has been dominated by infl ation targeting. Th e US, which was ground-zero for the fi nancial crisis, made infl ation its primary focus even though it stopped short of a formal infl ation target. Side-by-side with this focus on infl ation there was explicit opposition to targeting asset markets and asset price bubbles from both former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and current Chairman Ben Bernanke. 1 Th at policy confi guration -a focus on low infl ation plus relative neglect of asset markets -failed to prevent the build-up of massive fi nancial fragility and has been proved seriously fl awed. Now, the depth and severity of the ›Great Recession‹ provide an opportunity to reconstruct monetary policy.
Th is paper challenges the conventional wisdom regarding opposition to targeting asset markets and presents a policy framework for reining in asset and credit markets. Th is framework is based on a system of asset based reserve requirements that can enhance counter-cyclical monetary policy.
Th e Greenspan-Bernanke opposition to targeting asset bubbles has two components. First, there is a pure pragmatic objection that it is not possible to identify bubbles in advance. Second, there is a theoretical objection against targeting bubbles which is that explicit asset price targeting is not desirable. Part of this latter argument is that even if bubbles could be identifi ed, it would not be possible to safely pop them without exposing the economy to enormous collateral damage. For Bernanke, the problem of asset bubbles should be addressed by regulatory and supervisory measures rather than activist policy (Bernanke 2002: 2) .
2 Th e current paper argues against this theoretical position, and makes the case for a particular form of activist policy that has general application as part of counter-cyclical monetary policy. Th e paper begins by presenting a simple macro model that illustrates why monetary authorities should be concerned about asset bubbles, and why conventional policy may be unable to reverse their eff ects even if implemented rapidly. Not only do asset bubbles distort economic activity when they are infl ating, they leave behind damaging effects that can reduce activity long afterward. Th is provides the policy rationale for actively addressing them.
Th ereafter, the paper presents a policy framework based on asset based reserve requirements (ABRR) that permits activist anti-bubble policy interventions, but does not use the tool of interest rates which impose unacceptable collateral damage on the rest of the economy. ABRR give the monetary authority additional new policy instruments that can be specifi cally targeted on asset prices, thereby avoiding the collateral damage problem and circumventing the main argument against activist anti-bubble policy. 1 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan opposed formal infl ation targeting and targeting asset bubbles (Pearlstein 2002; Greenspan 2002a and 2002b) . Current Chairman Ben Bernanke favored formal infl ation targets but was against targeting asset bubbles (Bernanke 2002; Bernanke et al. 1999 , Bernanke/Mishkin 1997 . 2
Former Federal Reserve Governor Mishkin (2008) has made the additional argument that there is no need to target bubbles because their adverse eff ects can be nipped in the bud (i.e. cleaned up) if conventional interest rate policy is quick to respond when they burst. Th at is an empirical argument, and there are strong grounds to doubt its validity. Th e Federal Reserve was quick to lower interest rates in response to the bursting of the US house price bubble, to the extent of earning the ire of one well known economist (Buiter 2008 ), yet the economy has still tumbled into what has proved the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.
Lastly, the paper does not address the ›bubble identifi cation‹ argument. In this author's opinion, bubbles can be identifi ed. Stock market bubbles can be identifi ed through measures such as cyclically adjusted stock market price/earnings ratios, while house price bubbles can be identifi ed through measures such as house price/income ratios and house price/rental ratios. Th ere are of course diffi culties and risks (Type II errors) to bubble identifi cation, but the conduct of monetary policy always involves judgment and risk. Th is even holds for rule-based policy as the rule needs to be selected and implemented. If monetary authorities can make reasonable judgments about potential output, potential growth, and expected infl ation, they can also make reasonable judgments about asset price bubbles.
Central bankers' new economic model
Central bankers' opposition to targeting asset price bubbles can be understood in terms of the theoretical framework that also guides their thinking about infl ation. Th is framework has been labeled the »new consensus« macro model (Arestis/Sawyer 2006) . Figure 1 provides a stylized representation of the new consensus model. Th e core logic is that the level of aggregate demand (AD) drives fl uctuations in the output gap, which in turn drive the rate of infl ation and its deviation from target (be it explicit or implicit). Th e monetary authority then responds to these deviations according to its interest rate reaction function -a form of the so-called Taylor rule -and its interest rate response causes an adjustment of AD that brings output and infl ation back in line with target. 
Interest rate reaction function
Th e important feature of the model is that asset prices are viewed as just one of many different factors infl uencing AD. Th us, in Figure 1 asset prices enter into the funnel of AD along with business and consumer confi dence, global economic conditions, fi scal policy, exchange rates, and interest rates. According to this view, asset price bubbles are just one contributing factor to AD, and are no more worthy of a central bank's specifi c attention than is the state of business confi dence. Just as a central bank would not try to target the state of confi dence, nor should it try to target asset prices. Instead, it should manage the overall level of AD.
Th is view of the economy and the resulting approach to stabilization policy can be captured by the following simple model. Output is determined by the level of AD and is given by y = E (y , i L , P A , …) and E y > 0 , E iL < 0 , E PA > 0 ,
where y = output, E(.) = AD function, i L = market loan rate, P A = price of assets. Equation 1 is the conventional Keynesian IS function in which AD depends positively on the level of income, negatively on the loan interest rate, and positively on asset prices. The market interest rate is determined in the fi nancial sector according to
where i F = the central bank's policy interest rate (which in the US is the federal funds rate), and m = bank interest rate mark-up. Equation 2 replaces the old Keynesian LM schedule and captures the reality of interest rate determination in a world of endogenous credit money in which the central bank sets the short-term money market rate. Th e mark-up refl ects the liquidity preference of fi nancial market institutions, and can be considered a catch all for the state of fi nancial market confi dence, and attitudes toward and assessment of risk. Th e central bank chooses its target interest rate with the goal of hitting its output target, y * . Th is generates a federal funds rate of
Th e target interest rate is a negative function of the output target (y * ), a negative function of the fi nancial sector's mark-up (m), and a positive function of asset prices (P A ) and other factors positively infl uencing AD.
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Th e model is illustrated in Figure 2 . A higher output target requires a lower target interest rate because the monetary authority must bring down the market interest rate to increase AD. Likewise, a higher fi nancial sector mark-up requires a lower target interest rate. Th e reason is that to obtain the market interest rate needed to hit the output target, the monetary authority must bring down the base cost of funds. Asset prices aff ect AD by working through the common funnel described in Figure 1 . Th e eff ect of an asset price bubble, as understood within the conventional paradigm, is illustrated in Figure 3 . A bubble-induced increase in asset prices causes the IS to shift up. Th at induces the central bank to raise its target interest rate in order to maintain AD at a level consistent with its output target. After the bubble is over the IS shifts back down and the central bank then lowers its target interest rate. Th e underlying logic is that economic conditions are smoothly reversible. Consequently, after a bubble the central bank can engineer a return to the initial equilibrium conditions. 
Why the central bankers' model is wrong
Th ere are several major problems with the above bank model describing how central banks currently respond to asset bubbles. First, the model ignores the fact that bubbles generate economic distortions that have real costs. For instance, the US internet stock market bubble of the 1990s likely distorted investment by making too much capital available at too low a price to internet companies. More recently, the US house price bubble distorted economic activity by driving up house prices, thereby causing excessive residential investment. Second, the model ignores the fact that there are real costs from using interest rates to combat the infl ationary pressures unleashed by bubbles. Such costs can be termed ›blun-derbuss‹ eff ects, and they refer to the adverse impacts that increased interest rates have on sectors other than those aff ected by asset bubbles. Th us, raising interest rates to counter a bubble can adversely change the composition of output, giving rise to negative long term eff ects. One problem is that higher interest rates may decrease investment spending, which in turn reduces future productivity and output. A second problem is that higher interest rates may appreciate the exchange rate, adversely impacting the trade balance and manufacturing. If the appreciation is prolonged, that can accelerate de-industrialization and increase the adjustment strains of globalization. Consequently, blunderbuss eff ects can have both short-and long-run impacts on manufacturing and growth.
Another blunderbuss eff ect concerns income distribution (Th orbecke 1997). Here, higher interest rates adversely aff ect borrowers, while benefi ting creditors who receive higher interest payments. To the extent that many middle and lower income households are net borrowers, higher interest rates tend to worsen income distribution. Th at means using the interest rate tool to fi ght bubbles may compound income inequality because asset price bubbles disproportionately benefi t the wealthy, while fi ghting bubbles with interest rates disproportionately hurts net borrowers -who are generally the less wealthy.
Th e third and most important omission concerns debt ›footprint‹ eff ects. Th ese footprint eff ects refer to fi nancial stock eff ects that linger after a bubble is over if the bubble has been fi nanced by borrowing. When interest rates come down after the bubble, past borrowing imposes debt burdens that can weigh down the economy. Th e monetary authority may then be unable to adequately off set the AD eff ects of these burdens because of the zero nominal interest rate fl oor. 4 Th e working and impact of both debt footprint eff ects and interest rate blunderbuss eff ects can be incorporated into a modifi ed version of the above model. Now, the goods market is described by the following IS equation 4 It is worth distinguishing between debt-fi nanced asset bubbles and other asset bubbles. Th e former are associated with real estate bubbles and are particularly damaging because of the debt footprint they leave behind. Th e latter are more associated with stock market bubbles and appear to be less damaging and easier to escape. However, they also have real costs associated with distortion of investment decisions and the composition of output. y = E(y , i L , P A , B , D -1 , …) and E y > 0 , E iL < 0 , E PA > 0 , E B > 0 , E D < 0 , (4) where B = this period borrowing, and D -1 = last period's debt stock. Th e current fl ow of borrowing has a positive impact on AD, while last period's debt stock has a negative impact. It is this debt stock that gives rise to debt footprint eff ects.
Additionally, aggregate demand is decomposed into consumption, investment, net exports, and government spending as follows:
where C = consumption, I = investment, G = government spending, X = exports, M = imports, e = exchange rate (foreign exchange/domestic currency), -1 = last period level. Consumption is a positive function of income, asset prices, and borrowing, and a negative function of interest payments and the level of debt. Investment spending is a negative function of the interest rate, the exchange rate, and the level of debt.
6 Likewise, exports are negatively aff ected by the interest rate, which appreciates the exchange rate and lowers net exports. Imports are positively aff ected by exchange rate appreciation.
Th e fi nancial sector is described as follows:
D = D -1 + B(dP A , …) and B dPA > 0 ,
where dP A = change in asset prices. Equation 6 determines the loan rate as a mark-up over the central bank's target interest rate (which in the US is the federal funds rate), but now the mark-up is a positive function of the debt stock. Th is refl ects the fact that increased indebtedness increases borrower riskiness, resulting in increased credit spreads -a feature that has been clearly visible in the current fi nancial crisis. Equation 7 determines the evolution of the debt stock, which is equal to last period's debt plus this period's borrowing. Th is pe-5 For simplicity, the current model does not distinguish between residential and non-residential investment. Such sector distinctions can be introduced by adding separate investment functions, in which case higher asset (house) prices could spur residential investment spending. Additionally, residential investment spending would then be negatively impacted by debt footprint eff ects. 6
Th e exchange rate negatively impacts investment by increasing import competition, which reduces profi tability (see Blecker 2004) . In a more complicated model the level of debt could be decomposed into household and fi rm debt. Th e former would impact consumption while the latter would impact investment spending.
riod's borrowing is a positive function of the change in asset prices.
7 Equation 8 determines the evolution of asset prices, with the term dPA capturing the eff ect of a bubble.
Th e central bank sets its target interest rate as follows
Th us, the policy interest rate is set with an eye to hitting the output target. Th e policy rate is aff ected by asset price bubbles through their impact on borrowing and AD. Confronted by a bubble that increases AD, the central bank raises its policy rate to neutralize the bubble's AD impact. Th e blunderbuss eff ect of interest rate policy operates via Equation 5. An asset price bubble increases AD, causing the central bank to raise interest rates. Th is has a negative impact on investment spending. It also appreciates the exchange rate, which has a negative effect on exports and a positive eff ect on imports. Such blunderbuss eff ects were clearly present in the most recent US economic expansion. Th us, as the Fed gradually raised interest rates to try to slow the house price bubble and construction boom, this contributed to a strong dollar, record trade defi cits, and weak non-residential investment spending.
Th e debt footprint eff ect works through both goods markets and the fi nancial sector. Asset price bubbles increase consumption spending via the wealth eff ect and via increased borrowing. Increased borrowing raises debt, which then creates a debt footprint eff ect. Th e following period, when the bubble is over, the economy is left with a debt footprint that exerts a direct drag on spending in the goods market (Equation 5). Additionally, the increase in debt causes fi nancial institutions to increase their credit mark-up, widening the spread between the policy interest rate and the market loan rate (Equation 6). Th e net result is AD contracts directly, and the market interest rate rises, yielding a negative indirect eff ect on AD. Both types of eff ect have been visible in the wake of the bursting of the US house price bubble.
From a policy perspective the danger is that the economy may get stuck in a postbubble trap, such as is illustrated in Figure 4 . Th e source of the problem is the zero bound to the nominal policy interest rate. Th us, given post-bubble depressed AD conditions and higher interest rate mark-ups, the monetary authority may not be able to push its policy interest rate to a level suffi ciently low to achieve its real output target. In Figure 4 , full employment requires a loan rate of i L * , which in turn requires a central bank target rate of i F * < 0 . Th at is not possible because of the zero bound, and instead the central bank must settle for a policy rate of i F * = 0 . As a result the loan rate is i L = m(.) > i L * , leaving the economy demand constrained and short of full employment. Th is post-bubble trap was evidenced in Japan in the 1990s and it is now being experienced in the US in the wake of the implosion of its house price bubble. Th e UK also appears to be caught in the same trap.
Furthermore, pushing interest rates down to artifi cial lows can have reverse blunderbuss eff ects. Th us, just as raising the interest rate distorted the composition of economic activity, so too can excessively lowering it. In particular, this can produce exchange rate depreciation that causes imported infl ation and lowers living standards by worsening the terms of trade. It may also promote unstable infl ation expectations that encourage speculation in land and commodities that are sensitive to interest rates.
Lastly, in addition to the post-bubble interest rate trap, there may also be post-bubble capacity eff ects. One eff ect already noted is the potential destruction of manufacturing and tradable goods production capacity during the course of the bubble. A second eff ect, emphasized by Bernanke (1983) , is the potential for destruction of fi nancial capacity when the bubble defl ates. Th us, defl ation of a bubble combined with ensuing income contraction may trigger bankruptcies, which in turn cause banks and fi nancial intermediaries to fail. Th is process of destruction of fi nancial sector capacity, combined with the destruction of the credit-worthiness of borrowers, may disrupt the normal provision of credit. Th at can produce an outcome analogous to prolonged credit rationing in which only the only very best and most connected customers get credit. Consequently, both aggregate supply and aggregate demand may contract, leaving the economy stuck far below ›normal‹ potential output.
Asset bubbles and the policy instrument problem
Th e above analysis highlights the policy dilemma asset bubbles pose for policymakers. On the one hand, monetary authorities need to be able to respond to asset price bubbles -especially in real estate which is debt-fi nanced. However, responding with higher interest rates gives rise to blunderbuss eff ects. Th is points to need for additional policy instruments to target bubbles.
Such additional instruments can be provided via a system of asset based reserve requirements (ABRR) such as has been suggested by Palley (2000 Palley ( , 2003 Palley ( and 2004 . Under a system of ABRR, fi nancial intermediaries hold reserves against their assets. Th e reserve requirement for each asset category is adjustable and set at the discretion of the monetary authority, and asset categories can be zero-rated. To prevent regulatory arbitrage and avoid unfair competitive distortions, a system of ABRR should be applied to all fi nancial intermediaries. In eff ect, fi nancial intermediaries should be regulated on the basis of ›function‹ and not ›form‹, thereby ensuring a level playing fi eld for similar businesses regardless of the form fi rms choose to take.
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Given n diff erent asset categories, such a regulatory system creates n -1 additional policy instruments. Th e logic is as follows. Let ij denote the equilibrium interest rate on the j-th asset category. Without a system of ABRR the interest rate on this type of asset is
where m j (.) = mark-up required by fi nancial fi rms for holding assets of type j. Now, suppose assets in the j-th category are subject to a per dollar reserve requirement of k j . In that event, the required interest rate will adjust to
Th e logic is that because fi nancial fi rms have to hold reserves of k j they will require a higher return to compensate for the holding cost of those reserves. More generally, imposing reserve requirements on asset holdings creates a wedge between the interest rate on the asset class and the monetary authority's policy interest rate. Th e monetary authority can adjust the size of this wedge by varying the reserve requirement, and in doing so can change relative returns across asset classes. Th at gives it n -1 extra policy instruments whereby it can change relative interest rates on assets, and thereby infl uence portfolio and lending allocations.
As with conventional interest rate policy, ABRR work through the interest rate channel. Th e diff erence is that conventional interest rate policy raises the general interest rate, thereby aff ecting all asset classes and sectors simultaneously. Th at is the source of the blun- 8 Th e need for uniform regulation of the fi nancial system based on function and not form is emphasized by D'Arista and Schlesinger (1993) . Th ey presciently foresaw that the development of an unregulated parallel banking would lead to the type of credit excesses witnessed in the US house price bubble and mortgage crisis. derbuss collateral damage eff ect. ABRR avoid this problem by targeting a particular asset class and raising the interest rate for just that class. Consequently, they provide the benefi t of conventional policy, without its collateral damage costs.
Th e comparative logic of ABRR is illustrated in Figure 5 , which shows the diff erent economic logic embedded in alternative systems of balance sheet regulation. Th e fi rst system is liability based reserve requirements (LBRR), which is the conventional way of regulating banking systems. Under LBRR banks hold reserves (an asset) against deposits (a liability), so that the direction of causation fl ows from the liability side of the balance sheet to the asset side. When banks take on additional deposit liabilities they must hold additional reserves.
Figure 5: Comparison of diff erent forms of balance sheet regulation (1) Liabilities------------------>------------------Assets [LBRR = Reserves on deposits, collateral / margin requirements] (2) Assets---------------------->------------------Liabilities [Risk based capital standards] (3) Liabilities------------------>------------------Liabilities [debt-to-equity requirements] (4) Assets---------------------->------------------Assets [ABRR]
Th e second form of balance sheet regulation is risk based capital standards, which is currently the preferred form of regulation. Under this system, assets are categorized by riskiness and banks must hold more equity capital (a balance sheet liability) against more risky assets. Th us, causation runs from the asset side of the balance sheet to the liability side. When banks take on additional risky assets they must hold more equity capital.
Th e third form of balance sheet regulation is debt-to-equity standards. Both debt and equity are balance sheet liabilities so that causation runs between liability categories. If fi nancial fi rms take on more debt, they must hold more equity.
Th e fourth and fi nal form of balance sheet regulation is asset based reserve requirements. Under this system fi rms must hold reserves (an asset) against other assets. Th us, if fi rms expand the assets they hold, they must also increase their reserve holdings. Causation is therefore contained within the asset side of the balance sheet and runs from assets to assets.
Lastly, ABRR have some similarities with stock market margin requirements and they can therefore be easily misunderstood as equivalent. Th at is wrong and there are signifi cant diff erences. One diff erence is that ABRR would be levied against lenders, whereas stock market margin requirements are levied against borrowers who borrow to buy stock. A second key diff erence is that ABRR are counter-cyclical, whereas margin requirements can be pro-cyclical and create instability. Th us, if asset prices fall, margin requirements generate margin calls that oblige lenders to post additional collateral. Th at demand further stresses the system at a time it is already stressed, and if borrowers are unable to meet the call, their holdings may be sold which further depresses asset prices. In contrast, under a system of ABRR the decline in asset prices will free up reserves because required reserve holdings are based on the market value of the asset. Th at will loosen monetary conditions as needed.
Advantages of ABRR
A system of ABRR has numerous advantages. First, ABRR enable the monetary authority to aff ect the relative cost of diff erent asset categories while holding the policy interest rate constant. Th at provides monetary authorities with a precision instrument for infl uencing portfolio and lending allocations. For instance, if a monetary authority wanted to dampen a property bubble, it could impose reserve requirements on new mortgages. Th at would raise the cost of mortgages without raising the general level of interest rates, thereby targeting the bubble without imposing interest rate blunderbuss eff ects on the rest of the economy.
Second, as identifi ed by Th urow (1972) and Pollin (1993) , ABRR can be used to direct investment fi nance to neglected, socially deserving areas. For instance, if policymakers want to address problems of inner-city decline, they could impose negative reserve requirements on loans made for purposes of inner-city development. In eff ect, the central bank would subsidize such loans by lending reserves interest free to banks making such socially approved loans.
Th ird, ABRR have good counter-cyclical properties that render them a form of automatic stabilizer. Th e reserves held against an asset are calculated on the basis of the asset's value. Th at means when asset prices increase, as they do in booms, fi nancial fi rms need to increase their reserve holdings, thereby exercising a brake on the boom. Th e reverse holds for economic contractions. Th us, when asset prices fall as has been happening recently in the mortgage-backed securities market, this automatically frees up reserves and liquidity.
A fourth benefi t is the seignorage that accrues to the central bank as a result of fi nancial fi rms holding non-interest reserves issued by the central bank. A fi fth and related benefi t, is that ABRR re-build the demand for reserves issued by the central bank. Th is stands to strengthen the monetary policy transmission mechanism that has been eroded in recent years by the relative decline of banks compared to other fi nancial intermediaries (Friedman 1999) .
Of particular interest are the relative merits of ABRR compared to risk based capital standards (RBCS), which is the system of regulation currently advocated by central banks. A fi rst important strength of ABRR is that they promote counter-cyclical adjustment, whereas RBCS are pro-cyclical. In fi nancial downturns ABRR release reserves as asset prices fall, and they increase demand for reserves as asset prices rise. In contrast, RBCS force fi rms to raise more equity as assets deteriorate in quality, and that can be diffi cult during downturns. Consequently, RBCS can exacerbate credit crises.
A second advantage of ABRR is that it can be used as a tool of discretionary monetary policy, since the monetary authority can easily adjust reserve requirements in accordance with market conditions. Th at gives the monetary authority a tool for targeting particular asset categories that may be subject to asset price bubbles. Additionally, ABRR can serve some of the same functions as RBCS to the extent that the discretionary reserve requirement takes into account the riskiness of asset classes. Th us, if the monetary authority wants to discourage holdings of a particularly risky asset class, it can raise the reserve requirement on that class. RBCS are less suitable for this type of discretionary policy since it is costly for fi rms to raise equity capital, and it can be especially costly and diffi cult to do so in economic downturns and times of fi nancial stress.
A third advantage of ABRR relative to RBCS is that the former confer seignorage benefi ts, whereas RBCS do not. Additionally, ABRR strengthen the monetary policy transmission mechanism by increasing demand for the liabilities of the central bank, while RBCS do not.
Th is said, in principle, the two systems of regulation can even be combined. Th us, RBCS can be used to discourage excessive risk-taking by ensuring that fi nancial fi rms have ›some skin in the game‹, while ABRR can be used to assist monetary policy and target specifi c asset market problems.
ABRR and counter-cyclical capital requirements
Recently, Goodhart and Persaud (2008) have suggested the adoption of counter-cyclical capital standards to combat asset price bubbles. In their scheme, capital standards would rise with asset prices to prevent over-expansion of fi nancial intermediary balance sheets in booms, and would fall in busts to facilitate continued provision of credit. Counter-cyclical capital standards have similar objectives to ABRR, and in principle the two types of regulatory arrangement can be combined. However, once again there are several additional advantages to ABRR. One advantage, noted above, is that ABRR have seignorage benefi ts, and they also serve to tighten the monetary transmission mechanism by rebuilding the demand for reserves.
A second advantage concerns the precision of ABRR. A fi rm that is required to raise more capital will fi nd that its overall cost of capital rises, which will impact all of its activities and not just the activity that is bubble connected.
A third advantage of ABRR is they can easily be implemented on a discretionary national basis, which is very important because national conditions determine the need for counter-cyclical stabilization policy. Risk based capital standards have been introduced as a means of governing the global banking system to ensure banks are adequately capitalized. Such regulation is needed because banks are extremely inter-dependent for their stability, and it is also needed to prevent unfair competition and a regulatory race to the bottom be-9
As with ABRR, counter-cyclical capital standards also rely on policy discretion and the need to be able to identify bubbles. If these issues are obstacles to ABRR, then they are equally obstacles to counter-cyclical capital standards. tween countries. Given international mobility of fi nance, banks with lower capital requirements would have a cost advantage, thereby encouraging a shift of activity to a jurisdiction with lower capital standards. However, the need for global capital standards makes counter-cyclical capital standards diffi cult to implement because cyclical economic conditions will diff er across countries.
In eff ect, counter-cyclical capital standards will place the needs of national stabilization policy in confl ict with the needs of international fi nancial governance. Th is problem does not apply to ABRR because countries can unilaterally lower reserve requirements when the cycle turns down without undermining the agreed upon system of international fi nancial governance.
Lastly, ABRR have the additional advantage of being a form of reserve requirement, and reserve requirements have a long history of use in fi nancial regulation. Th ey are easy to adjust, their eff ects are well understood, and both bankers and central bankers are familiar with them.
Government bonds as the reserve asset?
Th e reserve asset in a system of ABRR is usually thought to be the liabilities of the central bank. However, another possibility is to allow banks to use government bonds as the reserve asset. Th is has both advantages and disadvantages.
Bonds are fl ex-price fi nancial assets whose price adjusts in response to changes in market interest rate conditions. Higher interest rates reduce the value of bond holdings, and if the value of fi rms' other assets are unchanged, that would require fi rms to hold additional bonds. Th e reverse would hold when market interest rates fall.
On the advantage side, this relationship between bond prices and interest rates creates an additional automatic stabilizer. Th us, when an economy starts to boom or when infl ation increases, interest rates would tend to rise and bond prices fall. Th is would automatically oblige fi nancial fi rms to allocate resources to buying additional bonds to top up their bond holdings, thereby limiting their fi nancial funds available for other activities.
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On the disadvantage side, fl uctuations in interest rates would tend to create uncertainty for fi nancial fi rms. Additionally, to the extent that bond market interest rates move perversely or do not respond to the business cycle, this would limit the automatic stabilizer property.
Finally, with regard to public fi nances, using government bonds as the reserve asset would increase demand for bonds, which would facilitate budget defi cit fi nancing and lower debt servicing costs. Balanced against this, the central bank would lose the seignorage that would come with having its liabilities serve as the reserve asset.
ABRR and the euro zone
ABRR have particular relevance for the euro zone and the European Central bank (ECB). Th e establishment of the euro represents an important step in the creation of an integrated European economy. Over time it should yield dividends as increased competition and lower transaction costs generate increased effi ciency. However, member countries have had to give up their own exchange rates and interest rates, and that has created problems for economic management by reducing the number of policy instruments. In particular, the ECB must wrestle with how to set interest rates when some countries are booming while others suff er high unemployment.
ABRR can help fi ll this policy instrument gap. Th is is because the ABRR can be implemented on a national basis. For instance, real estate lending, which has been a major concern, is particularly suited to this. Th us, when Spain and Ireland were suff ering excessive house price infl ation, the Spanish and Irish central banks could have raised reserve requirements on mortgage loans secured by property in those countries. Th at would have raised Spanish and Irish mortgage loan rates without aff ecting rates in the rest of the eurozone. Conversely, now that Ireland and Spain are suff ering house price defl ation, they would be able to lower reserve requirements on mortgages.
Nationally contingent ABRR will create incentives to shop for credit across countries. Th at means ABRR with a geographically specifi c dimension will work best when linked to geographically specifi c assets that cannot escape. Th is includes mortgage lending that is secured by collateralized property, and shares for which legal title is registered where companies are incorporated. For instance, mortgage loans are secured against specifi c real property, which determines the jurisdiction in which the loan falls and makes it diffi cult to escape compliance.
More generally, jurisdictional shopping involves transaction costs. Th ose transaction costs provide a wedge that allows ABRR to create cross-country interest rate diff erentials for wide categories of assets. Lastly, jurisdictional shopping would tend to promote crosscountry fi nancial integration, which is a long-term goal of the euro project. So even here there is an upside.
One possible problem with a system of ABRR is that it could raise political confl icts between the ECB and member countries. Th at suggests a two-tier system of ABRR, which would operate at both the eurozone and national levels. Eurozone ABRR policy would be controlled by the ECB, and the ECB would have the power to set ABRR across the euro zone with common requirements in all countries. National central banks would have the right to set country specifi c asset reserve requirement ratios, subject to the proviso that those requirements be no lower than the requirement ratio set by the ECB. Th is would give countries the power to set monetary policy that was tighter than that set by the ECB, but not looser. Such a system puts in place a fl oor to monetary policy that is needed to protect the integrity of the euro, but it gives individual countries the ability to pursue independent, tighter monetary policy if deemed necessary.
Conclusion
In recent years there has been debate over whether monetary policy should target asset price bubbles. Th at debate has become even more signifi cant in light of the destruction being caused by the implosion of the US house price bubble.
Both former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and current Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke are on record as being against targeting bubbles. Th is paper has argued an opposing position. Asset price bubbles can be extremely harmful. Th at was shown by the earlier defl ation of Japan's real estate bubble, and it is being shown again with the defl ation of the US house price bubble.
Th at said, the paper argues against using interest rates to target bubbles because interest rate policy imposes unacceptable collateral damage. Instead, the paper recommends adopting a system of ABRR that can provide additional policy instruments that enable targeting asset and credit market excess without raising the general level of interest rates. Such a system would also strengthen counter-cyclical monetary policy.
